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11 Representation
Michael Saward
‘Political theory’ is a wide and diverse body of work; in this book’s title,
it comes across as inert, the receptor, the thing that is acted upon. The
active ingredient, the ‘challenge’, is ecological. There is, of course, no
given, bounded body of political theory to be acted upon, but rather a
shifting set of arguments and assumptions. And the ecological challenge
is in fact many challenges – to conventional views of the state, social
justice, democracy, progress, individualism and more. Which of a range
of possibilities to pick when it comes to ‘representation’? How to
represent the problem of representation?
Political representation is normally discussed in terms of how accu-
rately elected representatives reflect the interests of voters. In this
chapter, I argue that representation happens in many more Places than
just elected legislatures, and in many more ways than the accurate
capturing of human interests. I start from the view that representative
claims are made by a great variety of political actors, and that repre-
sentation involves the active portrayal of constituencies rather than
simple reflection of them. From that base, it quickly becomes clear
that adding some ‘proxy’ representatives of nature into conventional
legislatures (Dobson 1996), for example, is just one part of the ecolo-
gical challenge, and probably not the most important part. Broader
portrayals or representations of nature matter in politics, and they
matter beyond just parliamentary politics.
The concept of political representation we need will move us beyond
the influential style of analysis of the (deserved) contemporary classic on
political representation, Hannah Pitkin’s The Concept of Representation
(Pitkin 1967). Pitkin sets up the problem of representation in a dis-
tinctive way. She describes her basic task as a metaphorical search for ‘a
rather complicated, convoluted, three-dimensional structure in the
0 The author would like to thank Karin Ba¨ckstrand, Andrew Dobson, Robyn Eckersley,
Phil Sarre and Grahame Thompson for helpful comments on previous versions of this
chapter.
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middle of a dark enclosure’ (1967: 10). Political theorists – Hobbes,
Burke, Madison and others – have given us photographs of this struc-
ture, she says, taken from various angles. These photographs offer dif-
ferent images or interpretations of representation. ‘Yet’, says Pitkin,
‘there is something there, in the middle in the dark, which all of them are
photographing; and the different photographs together can be used to
reconstruct it in complete detail’ (1967: 10–11). There is, in other words,
an essence of representation, a full view of it, three-dimensional and
complete.
It is easier to admire Pitkin’s work than to share her confidence. I
suspect that in fact any way or style of capturing the problem of repre-
sentation is more like a freeze-frame – one fragmentary, passing moment
amongst others – than the definitive three-dimensional photograph.
Pitkin is searching for a master metaphor which points to the essence of
representation. The problem is that the metaphor – rich and compelling
as it may be – remains a metaphor. Metaphors substitute for essences, or
so we often like to think, precisely because those essences are so elusive.
The trouble is that there are always other metaphors which depict their
object in a different light, with different emphasis. We cannot reach a
point where we say: ‘this is the right metaphor, this captures it, the work
is done.’
The elusiveness of the concept of representation itself is repeated for
the world of representations in which we live. No one picture or
representation of a thing, a person, an animal or whatever can securely
be thought to capture its essence. That sounds limiting and negative.
But there is another side to the coin. Metaphors or representations do
crucial work for us. We use them to find entry points to gaining some
understanding of processes, phenomena, people. But they do more even
than that. Often our metaphors create our entry points; what we cannot
imagine, what we cannot evoke with metaphor, we find difficult to see
and therefore study. In his writing on representation, Derrida (1982)
implies that we have to construct the concepts that bring into focus the
objects of our study in order to study them.
Both the necessity and unreliability of such representations are crucial
to carry into a discussion of political representation and the ecological
challenge.
A New Approach to Political Representation
My approach is informed by a view of political representation which is
based on three key background assumptions. First, in the words of
Dennis Thompson, ‘we must understand representation not as a
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relationship between constituents and representatives at particular
moments, but as a process in which the relationship between citizens and
representatives continues over time’ (1988: 136). Second, we should see
that representation as a process centres upon the practice of making
claims to be representative, and varied efforts to substantiate and to
contest those claims; and third, that ‘constituents’ and ‘representatives’
need not be members of electoral districts and elected parliamentarians
or councillors respectively – only by narrow political science conventions
do we confine discussion of political representation to parliamentary
politics and electoral processes.
Representation is always something in the making rather than
something achieved or completed, not least because it is tied up with an
economy of claim-making rather than fact-establishing. A representative
claim is a claim to represent, or to know what represents, the interests of
someone or something. The claim could be expressed in a variety of
ways. For example, I could claim to represent the interests of a person,
or the needs of a country or region, or the needs of non-sentient nature.
I could claim to embody the desires of my co-religionists, or that a
painting accurately represents a particular landscape (and so on). Any
claim can be and normally is subject to dispute, and may be accepted,
ignored or rejected by individuals or groups.
Representative claims differ enormously from one to the next, but
there are common elements at an abstract level. Claims have a maker –
the one who asserts them. The maker puts forward a subject – perhaps
herself, perhaps a symbol, perhaps a social group or party – as standing
for or signifying an object, such as a human electoral constituency or an
endangered species. The object of a representative claim is a concept, an
idea of a real thing rather than the thing itself; the latter is more helpfully
understood as the referent. Finally, claims have an audience, which may
accept or reject claims. Critics may argue that to put all these elements
together is to pack too much into a conception of representation, but it
seems to me that all are vital. If we drop the maker or audience, for
example, and concentrate on signification (subject as signifier, object as
signified), we catch the technical side but miss vital political and cultural
aspects of representation.
An example of a conventional representative claim would be: the
member of parliament (M) offers herself (S) as the embodiment of
constituency interests (O) with respect to a legally defined set of people
in a constituency (R) to that constituency (A). Or: the green party (M)
offers itself (S) as the protector of the interests of endangered species
(O) with respect to the animals in question (R) to governments and the
broader media and public (A).
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Contained within the notion of the representative claim is an argu-
ment that aesthetic and cultural modes of representation are themselves
political, and need to be seen as an integral part of what political
representation is all about.
There is an indispensable aesthetic moment in political representation
because the maker has to be an artist, to operate aesthetically, to evoke
the represented. If for example an electoral constituency’s interests were
transparent, then a representative could simply ‘read off’ those interests
and act on them. But the signified, or the object, is not the same as the
collection of people who make up the constituency (the referent). It is a
picture, a portrait, an image of that electorate. The ‘interests’ of a
constituency have to be ‘read in’ via a subject or signifier, not ‘read off’.
This is an active, creative process, not one of passive reception of signals
from below. The business of political figures, parties, lobby groups and
social movements is aesthetic because it is political.
And political representation is necessarily cultural in the sense that
there are cultural limits to the types of subject – object links that can
plausibly be made in a given context. Potential audiences of repre-
sentative claims have cultural codes which will make them receptive to
some claims and unreceptive to others. In Stuart Hall’s terms, ‘[c]odes
fix the relationship between concepts and signs [subject and object in
my terms]. They stabilise meaning within different languages and cul-
tures’ (Hall 1997: 21). These are codes which would-be political
representatives can exploit.
A full account would require exploring the representative claim much
more. For example, we would need to think about how an audience may
or may not hear a message as it was intended, or dispute it by con-
structing its own alternatives. But my focus here is green political theory
representations of ‘nature’ – constructions of nature as an object,
intended for professional or political audiences. Constructions of nat-
ure, like those of other phenomena, are aesthetic creations using cultural
resources. Green challengers to ‘grey’ or ‘brown’ political theory and
politics question existing representations of nature and offer new ones. I
turn now to specific examples and to raise some questions about them in
the light of the preferred approach to political representation.
Green Political Theory and the Challenge to
Representation
Selected works by Andrew Dobson, John Dryzek, Robyn Eckersley and
Robert Goodin examined here are sophisticated green attacks on con-
ventional representative democratic institutions. What I want to do is to
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deploy elements of the framework outlined above to shed light on some
lesser-noticed aspects of what is going on in the ecological challenge’s
representations of nature especially.
Dobson invokes a ‘species’ as having interests which might adequately
be represented when ‘assured of the conditions to provide for its survival
and flourishing’ (1996: 137). Faced with the question of which animals
are to be represented, and to what extent, Dobson invokes the rich
metaphor of the ‘hierarchy of moral considerability’ which his proposed
special parliamentary representatives for non-human animals – the
proxies – should debate and decide for political purposes. Finally, he
offers us a representation of future generations, people who will exist
and who will ‘want both a viable environment in which to live and the
possibility of satisfying their basic needs’ (1996: 132). In short, here are
‘representations’ of another sort, choices about the depiction of poten-
tial new ‘constituencies’ – one might say choices about how to constitute
constituencies. The theorist (M) puts forward proxy representatives
carrying hierarchies and flourishing conditions assumptions (S) as
defining and standing for the needs of animals and of future generations
(O) with respect to animals and presumed future people (R) for con-
sumption by a human political audience (A). The assumptions about
flourishing and needs look general and reasonable, but in theory they are
not the only ones that proxies might come up with. They are the the-
orists’ creations, his preferred representations of the problem. The
creations are theoretical, but they are also political in a deep way: they
involve particular claims about what interests are, how they need to
be construed. And those particular claims play their role in making a
new potential political constituency visible, of defining it through
representation.
Let me turn to Eckersley’s essay, ‘Deliberative Democracy, Repre-
sentation and Risk’ (2000). This piece is an account of the limits of
conventional representative machinery in the face of pressing ecological
problems and demands. Future generations and other species form
‘communities of fate’ which have the potential to be harmed by political
decisions and industrial processes. Therefore they are interests that
ought to be represented within our political structures. Future genera-
tions and other species cannot represent themselves, so they must be
represented in some other way. Eckersley considers positively the
potential of a modified version of deliberative democracy to assist in
bringing about a more ecologically sensitive democracy.
There are two points here. The first is an interesting tension in
Eckersley’s account of representation. On the one hand, she places
weight on the idea of stretching elected representatives’ imaginations, as
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a way of ensuring that the interests of future generations and other
species are taken on board in decision-making. On the other, she tends
to regard the interests of these constituencies as real and singular.
Admittedly this needs to be read between the lines of her account, but
there are plenty of relevant lines to read. For example, she refers to ‘the
perspectives of differently-situated others’, ‘the concerns and interests of
differently-situated others’, of adopting ‘the standpoint of differently-
situated human and non-human others’ (2000: 128–9). The main
challenges to representatives being able to imagine these interests, she
argues, are epistemological and motivational. The epistemological
challenge is how to know, to recognise, those interests. An institutional
mechanism that can help us to meet this challenge is ‘mandatory state-
of-the-environment reporting’ (2000: 129). In short, there is an
emphasis on the singular knowability of the interests concerned. Here, I
want to suggest, is an example of unidirectionality. A unidirectional
approach to representation proceeds from the assumed given character
of the represented to the adequacy of the representatives’ perception of
that character. In the terms of the model, two things are happening.
First, the distinction between object and referent is glossed over – future
people (R) have determinate interests (O) just because they will exist.
And second, the process of knowing those interests involves discovery by
appropriate technique (state-of-the-environment reporting). The maker
and the subject are set aside, missing therefore the necessarily con-
stitutive role played in these elements of representation. My argument
will be that representation should instead be seen as bidirectional (or
multidirectional), recognising the interpretative and selectively creative
role of makers and subjects in representation. Using Eckersley’s own
terms, I am suggesting that the imagination or ‘enlarged thinking’ of her
subjects, the elected representatives, stretches beyond the role of
knowing by discovery what is already there (the interests of future
generations, for example), to actively evoking one or more potential
versions of what is there to be represented. It might be protested that
techniques like state-of-the-environment reporting have a scientific
status that overcomes the partiality and selectivity of representations; I
shall say more on scientific representations of nature in a moment.
I now turn to some brief comments on discursive and decentralist
green challenges as exemplified in works by Goodin and Dryzek.
Goodin, like the other green theorists, wants to find a way to make
nature’s interests figure in political decision-making. Beyond general
comments in favour of decentralist and participatory democracy, he
builds a conception of democracy in which the internalisation of
the interests of others plays a central part. Interests, whatever their
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source and whoever or whatever bears them, should be represented; if
their bearers cannot represent themselves, then a notion of interests
‘encapsulated’ by others who can, becomes acceptable, even desirable.
Goodin argues that ‘In so far as natural objects have objective values
that can properly be construed as interests, those ought be politically
represented just as any others’ (1996: 837). So, values in nature are
objective – there, given, regardless of human recognition or not. Again,
the necessary gap between object and referent is closed off – the concept
of what value natural objects may have is collapsed into the material of
those objects themselves. These values, according to Goodin, require an
‘appreciator’ to turn them into interests, to represent them politically.
Goodin the theorist is the maker of this representation, and the appre-
ciator is his subject. The appreciator’s skills are subjective, of course,
and Goodin recognises this fact. But the values, on his account, are
objective, to be discerned rather than creatively construed (as I argue
they can only be). His model offers us a transmission belt, transferring
objective values to the passive receptor that is the appreciator. The very
idea of an appreciator implies such one-way traffic – an appreciator has
(merely) to see what’s already there.
Nature, then, has interests that ought to be represented. These are to
be discovered, appreciated. Then they need to be internalised. The one-
way traffic continues at this point. To ‘internalise’ implies that there is a
single external reality to be transferred – there is something specific
outside that can be brought inside our heads. There is no guarantee,
Goodin writes, that ‘people will necessarily internalise nature’s interests
completely or represent them perfectly’ (1996: 844). The idea that in
principle these interests could be represented ‘completely’ or ‘perfectly’
reinforces their presumed single and unalterable character. These
interests require no active mediation and little interpretation; the
appreciator’s role remains that of a passive receptor. Interests are to be
read off nature, not read into it (my words, not Goodin’s).
My suggestion is that Goodin emphasises too much the objectivity of
nature’s value and interests, and that this leads to an overly unidirec-
tional view of the transmission of those interests into politics. To be
sure, we are dealing with matters of emphasis here rather than black-and-
white distinctions. Nevertheless, it leaves aside the necessarily creative
role of the representative, one that requires the incumbent to construct,
reconstruct, choose, depict and portray that which needs to be repre-
sented (‘nature’, in this case). The process is two-way, as I have tried to
argue above. The representative / politician must be a maker of repre-
sentations, an artist, even if a bad or unwitting one. Much less is given,
much less is capable merely of being ‘read off’ than Goodin presumes.
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In other words, we have here (I suggest) an example of a problematic
objectivity assumption along with one of unidirectionality.
Let me turn to Dryzek’s radical analysis and prescription. As a dis-
cursive democrat, for whom unconstrained communication is the ideal
political mechanism, Dryzek seeks to deepen and extend radically the
meaning and spaces of political communication, seeking ‘a more egali-
tarian interchange at the human / natural boundary’ (2000: 145). Nature
is not only a source of ‘interests’, which are ‘affected’. In Dryzek’s eyes,
nature is an agent too; it is not ‘passive, inert, and plastic’. Instead, this
world is truly alive, and ‘pervaded with meanings’ (2000: 148). This
agency means we must recognise and respect nature in wholly new ways.
For Dryzek, the key metaphor here involves ‘listening’ – ‘we should
listen to signals emanating from the natural world with the same sort of
respect we accord communication emanating from human subjects, and
as requiring equally careful interpretation’ (2000: 149).
My main point here, echoing others above, is that listening implies a
passivity on the part of the listener, mere receptiveness of what is given.
Dryzek’s listener is blood brother to Goodin’s appreciator in this key
respect – he or she is the subject within the representative claim being
made. ‘Effective listening’ is hearing and heeding the ‘feedback signals’
from nature; it is largely passive, though it is a role that no doubt
requires attentiveness and acquaintance. Essentially unidirectional like
others, Dryzek’s analysis closes down the object-referent gap and
implies that nature largely determines what the subject-listener hears.
Interestingly, the maker is a voice outside the text, too. The theorist here
adopts the classic silent stance of the author, setting to one side his role
as maker of the representation involving the listener and nature. This is
understandable – it is a deep convention of academic and other writing –
but it is worth noting that it has the effect of reinforcing the objectifying
character of the claims being made. That is not to denigrate his efforts;
as I shall try to argue below, this analysis can prompt a clearer view of
the political role of (in this case green) political theory.
Dryzek’s account moves on to the political institutional corollary of all
this – the idea that the state, as we know it, is so constrained by anti-
ecological imperatives that it is not likely to be a good ‘listener’ in the
present sense. Elected representatives within the state are no different
from other state personnel in this respect. Accordingly, Dryzek adopts
the bioregional paradigm, where ‘redesigned political units should
promote, and in turn be promoted by, awareness on the part of their
human inhabitants of the biological surroundings that sustain them’
(2000: 157). The connection between listening to nature and living close
to it in reconfigured units is explicit: people who are close to nature are
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‘in day-to-day contact with particular aspects of the ecosystem, and
therefore in a much better position than distant managers or politicians
to hear news from it’ (2000: 157).
In essence, the listening in Dryzek’s account is presented as an
unmediated relation between listener and nature. Literally, those closer
to particular places can ‘hear’ them better. Dryzek explicitly separates
the ‘listening’ aspect of democracy from its representative aspect (2000:
154), and makes it clear that ‘unlike the situation in aggregative liberal
democracy, this communication does not have to be mediated by the
material interests of particular actors’ (2000: 154). Interestingly, Dryzek
suggests that we ought to be careful not to ‘anthropomorphise’ (2000:
151). He is keen to avoid aesthetic representations, which would require
and emphasise a gap between nature and listener. But one can argue
(and I would) that to anthropomorphise is one mode of using metaphors
as coded subjects to ‘get at’ (to make audible, as a parallel to making
visible) nature’s messages. It is one example of a move that is essential or
unavoidable if one is to even attempt ‘readings’ of nature. Such meta-
phors, or representations, far from distorting messages from nature,
make ‘listening’ possible. Dryzek of course uses his own metaphors –
notably that of the ‘feedback signal’, an electronic metaphor for nature
which, precisely because it belongs to a different realm, brings into view
a conception of the object we wish to understand.
Like Rousseau, Dryzek is suspicious of representation in two of its
aspects, aesthetic and conventional-political, and he would like to
transcend both. His prescription is radical indeed, favouring a highly
decentralised, bioregional politics. In essence, Dryzek has a dream of
political authenticity, of direct politics, more or less spontaneous and
unmediated. Ultimately, it seems to me, this sort of work taps into deep-
seated Garden of Eden metaphors – back to nature means back to a
simpler, more authentic, more tuned-in human nature, of something
roughly analogous to humanity before the Fall. The Rousseauian links
are evident enough: a vision full of politics, but of spontaneous orders of
politics, relatively free of the corrupting artifice of aggregative repre-
sentative institutions as we know them.
Representation, Metaphor and Institutional Design
Let me try to take stock of these selective comments on green writings
on representation and offer some observations on some key character-
istics of the green thinking identified with respect to representation:
unidirectional approaches, objectivity and authenticity claims.
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The first major criticism was that of unidirectionality, the problem of
seeing representation as a one-way process, where the representative is a
mere receptor or reflection of some primary object or person or group.
Representation, I have argued, is best seen as bi- or multidirectional:
representative and represented are in a shifting and mutually con-
stitutive relationship. Real things, people, animals and species exist. To
be sure, there are limited sets of ways in which these referents could be
described or accounted for. But that leaves plenty of scope for com-
peting representations or constructions of them as objects. Making these
representations or constructions is what politicians, artists and political
theorists do. Representation works in two directions: the referent’s
material reality conditions the range of what can be said about it, and
makers and subjects create representations within that range.
Overlapping with that point, I criticised some greens for assuming
that an authentic presence of ‘nature’ or its interests was ‘out there’, if
only we could listen carefully enough, or get close enough to it. By
contrast, my preferred approach holds that identity in representation is
authored rather than authentic, that it is necessarily partial and selective.
I was also critical of a further closely related green tendency to see
nature or the environment as possessing ‘objective interests’.
Do these criticisms amount to a rejection of green political thinking?
Not at all. But they might point to a different approach, one more in
tune with a broader and thicker conception of political representation. I
turn now to how we might deal with metaphors of nature as repre-
sentations, and subsequently comment on the politics of green thinking.
Stressing the constructedness of our representations or conceptions of
nature does carry some tricky judgements. I do think that the ‘epistemic’
dimension of representing non-humans and other species is sometimes
overemphasised. There is more to be said for an alternative, ‘inter-
pretive’ approach, which allows more space for accepting and exploring
a plurality of competing representations (reading in possibilities rather
than reading off certainties). However, it makes little sense to press this
point to the bottom. Raising the epistemic questions does at least have
the virtue of leading us to ask ‘how do you know?’ and invites critical
discussion of different forms of knowledge generation. This, for exam-
ple, can lead us to key issues about the status of scientific knowledge.
Clearly, natural phenomena (like volcanoes) exist and have an impact
beyond cultural representations of them. As I have indicated, I do not
argue that there is no referent, or extra-discursive reality. Certain forms
of knowledge of them in this respect can have a particular, if contingent,
validity. A ‘more valid’ representation of nature in this respect means
one that is more efficacious, gains more purchase on the phenomenon in
Michael Saward192
question when applied or assumed. I would go so far as to say that a
strong consensus in the broader scientific community regarding validity
is a strong indicator of validity. Producing broad and deep consensus
among specialists with expertise is a powerful thing. The scientific,
causal debates about global warming have largely been settled recently
by the sheer degree of scientific consensus on causes and likely
consequences of climate change.
Which representations of ‘nature’/nature we may rely upon more is a
relative and difficult matter, though. As suggested, the claims of scien-
tific knowledge rest upon assumptions about the social dimension of
creating scientific knowledge and on the Popperian fallibilist view that
science proves nothing but offers ‘conjectures and refutations’. There is
no escaping representations, then – we cannot ‘see’ nature without
metaphors or mediating representations which characterise it and bring
it into focus – and no non-contingent means to judge relative validities,
even if we agree with Soper’s excellent account of these issues when she
observes that, even if there is a lot of culture in nature, there is some
nature which is also not just culture (Soper 1996).
Having said that, some metaphorical representations of nature have
had great material consequences because people have acted upon them.
Other ways of seeing nature have had less impact, including until recent
times metaphors favoured by greens (such as the idea of ‘partnership’
discussed by Plumwood in this volume). There are many and varied
ways in which ‘nature’ can be, and has been, represented. The power of
metaphors of nature often grows from a sliding from one meaning of
‘nature’ – nature as ‘the essential quality or character of something’ – to
another, namely ‘the external, material world itself’ (Demeritt 2002:
777–8). Sliding from the first to the second meaning can lead us to
believe that when we gaze into the external world we are accessing some
sort of essence. This is a powerful tool, and one of course that has been
exploited by classic political theorists such as Hobbes and Rousseau,
and continues today in arguments that, for instance, the free market is a
‘natural’ way for people to interact and to meet their needs.
Dominant metaphors can tell us a great deal about the societies that
hold to them. They can also tell us a great deal about what can or should
be done to the ‘nature’ which the metaphors make visible. We can look
at these on a grand historical scale. Three main metaphors – ‘the book of
nature, man as the microcosm, and the world as machine’ – have
informed Western views of nature, according to Mills (Mills 1982: 237).
In terms of the preferred model of representation, these metaphors are
subjects which are put up by those who use them (makers) to signify
their object (nature). In the Middle Ages, the dominant metaphor of the
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book of nature implied, for example, that nature had an author, that its
meanings could be read, that it had varied levels of meaning, and that
physical nature bore legible marks of the authorial hand or presence.
This theocratic view gave way in the Renaissance to a more anthro-
pomorphic view in which humanity rather than God provided the
dominant metaphor. Man, or more specifically the human body, was the
measure of all things. Mills invites us to
consider how much of the language we still habitually employ derives from just
such an anthropomorphic view of the world. We speak of mountains as pos-
sessing ‘brows’, ‘shoulders’, ‘backs’, and ‘feet’, and rivers have ‘heads’ and flow
through ‘gorges’ out into ‘mouths’. We refer to a ‘neck’ of land, an ‘arm’ of the
sea, a ‘vein’ of mineral ore, and the ‘bowels’ of the earth. (1982: 242)
Finally, into the modern era, the metaphor shifted to that of the ‘earth
machine’. Clocks and later computers became the source of concepts for
nature. Viewing nature through mechanistic metaphors implies that
nature is made and can be remade, and that it can be controlled and
tinkered with.
By looking at dominant metaphors we can learn a great deal about the
societies which harboured and developed and lived by the metaphors:
‘Nature is no more a book or a giant human being than it is an extra-
ordinarily complex machine. That certain societies should find such
views of it convincing, however, is highly informative and provides us
with a direct means of knowing their central needs and aspirations’ (Mills
1982: 249). Without assuming that these metaphors were unchallenged
or unambiguous, we can also learn what might, and often did, follow
from their prominence. A machine, for example, can be owned and used
and dismantled and changed and sold and controlled – a machine
metaphor determines nothing in itself, but it carries the potential to
facilitate domination and commercialisation of nature. A machine
implies a maker of the machine and a purpose, so religious views of nature
might be at home with the machine metaphor, too. My point is that
metaphors underpin belief, and belief underpins actions. The metaphors
of nature we have and use condition what we can do with and to nature.
That is probably too much the grand sweep of history approach.
From a more modest but probably a more fruitful perspective, we
inhabit a messier and dynamic world of competing and overlapping
metaphors. Among the ones that green political theorists and others
often address critically are:
– economic metaphors, concerned with nature’s ‘richness’ and invol-
ving ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’
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– pyramidal metaphors with ‘humans as the pinnacle of evolution’
– sex-typing metaphors such as ‘mother nature’, carried over into ideas
of, for example, ‘virgin nature’
– mechanistic and cybernetic metaphors
– wild nature as an agricultural crop (‘harvesting the fish crops’)
(Meisner 1992: 2)
The green temptation is to find better, alternative metaphors, such as
Nature as home, Nature as musical (‘harmony in diversity’), Nature as a
living being, and so on (Meisner 1992: 2). Metaphors are nothing if not
suggestive and multifaceted, and any one metaphor will outrun attempts
to characterise it or interpret its implications in one direction. Thus
there is no single, unambiguous good or bad, helpful or dangerous
metaphor from a political ecological point of view. It is just not that
simple. Meisner, in his thoughtful account of the issue, seeks new
metaphors which are ‘both evocatively powerful and cognitively prac-
tical; they must evoke positive feelings about nature, and suggest a
conception that leads to humility, respect, and non-exploitative ways of
living’ (1992: 9). He recognises how elusive such metaphors are likely to
prove, though he favours, for example, ones which see nature as alive,
as process rather than as thing, as partner rather than as possession
(1992: 8) (see Plumwood, this volume).
We have seen how powerful the temptation is for all of us – green
political theorists are hardly the exception – to seek to break the
boundaries of representation, to find directness, engagement, contact,
authenticity, as I have suggested Dryzek does. The desire to escape
from, or to fix upon ‘better’, metaphors is a recognition of the power of
the material consequences of metaphor or representations, and at the
same time a tilt towards overcoming the undesirable contingencies of
the play of representations in political life.
Because we cannot escape representations in a larger sense, it is a
positive thing from a green point of view that radical political efficacy
does not require such an escape. Representation is a rich concept, and it
can readily encompass the mutual constituting and indeterminacy pre-
sent in all relations between one who represents and one who is repre-
sented. At the same time, the concept is rich enough to point us to claims
and practices well beyond traditional parliamentary representation, as I
indicated at the outset. Animals can be engaged with, looked for, traced,
understood and appreciated in new ways by humans opening up
themselves to new ways of ‘reading’ and ‘writing’ them (see, for example,
Hinchliffe et al. 2004). But to do this is to tap into new ideas of what it
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means to represent, and to make representations, in the senses of both
what it can involve and who can do it. We live in and by representations,
and representation making is a necessary human activity, not one that
diminishes in importance just through physical proximity to or fami-
liarity with ‘nature’ or anything else. The desire to move beyond a politics
of representation to a direct engagement with nature is understandable
enough, but it is misconceived. Our need to ‘make up nature’ does not go
away just because we are close to it (or even because we are it).
Politics brings varied representations into play. Perhaps, instead of
‘enfranchising constituencies that are affected’ – the traditional, parlia-
mentary way of looking at representation – we could look to multiple
representations or constructions of the affected (nature), putting new
interpretations and perspectives ‘into play’, politically. Perhaps, too, this
is the real task of green parties and pressure groups – makers of pro-
vocative new metaphors of nature, creators of portrayals that can win
hearts, minds, votes and actions (see also Eckersley 2003).
It is here that the point about politics and theory, which I mentioned
in the context of the green critique, comes into its own. Looked at from
a particular angle, one can say that what Eckersley, Dobson, Goodin
and Dryzek variously offer is a compelling set of metaphors or repre-
sentations of nature: mysterious constructions about nature alive, per-
vaded with meanings, speaking to us if only we can listen, replete with
interests that are comparable to our own, a set of forces demanding our
attention and deserving our respect. In short, what we have gained from
these writers are metaphors which link conceptions of nature with
political prescription. These are potentially powerful political arguments,
aesthetically compelling and culturally resonant representations of nat-
ure. That will not be news to anyone, but I mean the claim in a strong
way: dressed and presented and published as political theory, they are in
fact a highly sophisticated form of political argument, the home for
which ultimately (in a well-functioning democracy) ought to be the cut
and thrust of daily political life, in the parliamentary politics of repre-
sentation to be sure, but well beyond there to the local and international,
formal and informal political spaces where representation happens,
representations are made and power is generated.
From a green perspective, forging and refining and arguing for
metaphors of nature which prompt pro-ecological actions is the right
approach. I am engaged in something much less than that task here. A
prerequisite to the success of such efforts is an open society which allows
a richer variety of representations to become available. A dynamic
process of making and remaking representations of nature – on a crude
level, this overlaps with a ‘the more, the better’ view – is a positive thing
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for various reasons. We might adapt J. S. Mill’s argument, that we can
only know the rightness of one argument by testing it against others, to
say that the efficacy of making nature visible through one metaphorical
representation can be teased out and tested by way of contrast with
another or others. We could say that unmasking metaphors which
facilitate environmental destruction is all the more easy when alter-
natives can be evoked or created or deployed in argument (it is for-
tunate, for example, that by the time the former premier of the
Australian state of Tasmania described the Franklin River, the proposed
damming of which provoked a major environmental dispute in the early
1980s, as a ‘brown, leech-ridden ditch’, there was a strong environ-
mental movement to argue for alternative images and portrayals of the
wild river and Tasmanian wilderness more generally). We might cite the
imaginative power of metaphor as a contributor to processes of
‘reflective democracy’ (Goodin 2003), where citizens and politicians are
invited or induced to reflect upon the interests and needs of human and
non-human others by exposure to provocative depictions and accounts.
In my limited way here, I have pointed out how green political theorists
themselves offer potent metaphors with real political resonance.
I suggested at the outset that questions of democratic institutional
design lurk within my comments. If democratic representation happens
in but also well beyond elective and parliamentary domains, then our
thinking about innovative democratic designs can and should follow
suit. We might start, for example, from the premise that institutiona-
lising multiple modes of representing a range of shifting human and
non-human interests is perfectly democratic, and that seeking means to
test openly in argument varied representations of nature requires new
democratic thinking. This is a complex topic indeed, and these are very
brief comments – I have written elsewhere how varied devices, placed in
sequences, might evoke and draw in to democratic processes more
interests and needs and phenomena than merely living human con-
stituencies, and indeed alternative representations of the latter too
(Saward 2003). Alongside a representative parliament, why not a citi-
zens’ jury to evoke statistical representation, local forums to evoke
representation-in-place, a parliament of Dobsonian proxies of nature and
future generations, and the precautionary principle to capture assumed
needs and interests whose character at present eludes the reach of our
understanding? Representative politics is much more about port-
rayal and image making in argument than it is often assumed. Green
political theorists, I have suggested, are engaged precisely in these
political debates than more conventional readings of their work
might indicate. Their work on political ecology might pose one major
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challenge in particular to mainstream political theory – how to imagine
in detail a democracy that revels in representative politics in the broader
and deeper sense, since the metaphors and representations we invoke
are critical to shaping political outcomes, for ‘nature’ and for us as a
part of it.
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